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1. INTRODUCTION
Paglieri has written us a welcome appreciation of the prospects and likely facts of
argument escalation. As he observes, our community has an unconsciously optimistic
point of view about argument processes. For the most part we expect properly conducted
arguments to approach consensus or some sort of happy mutuality. When this does not
happen, we are inclined to find fault, either with the arguers, their argument schemes, or
the argumentation process. Paglieri helps us to understand that intelligent people
operating with reasonable competence may nonetheless accomplish destructive
escalation. Although we may be able to understand and predict this outcome, we may
nonetheless find ourselves with no person, text, or process to blame. Escalation is not
necessarily diagnostic of bad arguing or bad arguers: the encounter may simply have
begun with awful prospects.
I find several aspects of Paglieri’s development to be unusually interesting, and so
I will confine my remarks to those. In particular, I am impressed with his analysis of
matters pertinent to argument engagement—that is, the decision whether to engage or
not. This is an important and under-researched topic in argument studies. I consider that
Paglieri has already explored escalation rather thoroughly, so I will confine myself to
appreciating and projecting his thinking onto the topic of engagement.
2. ARGUMENT ENGAGEMENT
Paglieri treats two sets of ideas that each tell us something about whether or not a person
will engage in argument. They do so from points of view that are distinguished in their
abstractness. Paglieri treats these for their relevance to whether an argument will escalate,
but they are also informative about the engagement decision.
The more abstract set of ideas is the first one, which Paglieri uses to develop some
ideas that are theoretical on their face, and which may well be appreciated at some level
by naïve actors. These include four factors: epistemological, cost/benefit, articulation,
and socio-cultural. The epistemological factor refers to the chance that an argument will
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escalate as the arguers begin to regard one another as not simply disagreeing, but as being
blind to good reasons. The cost/benefits factor recognizes that as an argument proceeds it
takes up more and more resources, so that a failure of agreement is more frustrating and
costly at the end of the encounter than it was in the beginning. The articulation factor is
somewhat similar to the epistemological one: here, the process of arguing exposes the
arguers’ reasons and beliefs, leading to an explosion of subsidiary disagreements. Finally
the socio-cultural factor refers to the social appropriateness of arguing at that time, in that
place, on that topic, with that partner.
Paglieri offers these as potential sources for escalatory pressures. But since none
of these are beyond the natural experience of arguers, we should entertain the idea that
ordinary people are sensitive to these matters in some degree. I take as a base assumption
the proposition that people will not voluntarily engage in an argument that is going to
explode. There will be exceptions to this generalization: sometimes a person will want to
incite, a particular situation may punish avoidance more than escalation, an arguer may
have lost emotional control, or a person may simply be quite verbally aggressive. We will
need to think differently about these sorts of circumstances and make allowance for them
in our theorizing. Today, however, let us simply take as given the idea that when people
have reason to anticipate escalation, they will not engage in arguing.
Given this assumption, Paglieri’s thinking offers us a number of testable
hypotheses about argument avoidance. These need only be slightly revised from his more
or less explicit hypotheses about which arguments will escalate. The engagement
hypotheses following from his first set of ideas are these:
1. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they anticipate that the
other person will not be reasonable.
2. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they anticipate that the
costs of arguing will exceed the projected benefits from that particular interaction.
3. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they anticipate that the
process of arguing will reveal more and more disagreements than were apparent at the
point when the engagement decision needed to be made.
4. People are less likely to engage in an argument when arguing would be socially
inappropriate.
Conceptually, this is a small step—moving from the reasons for escalation, to the
possibility that arguers can anticipate escalation, to predictions about whether they will
engage.
Paglieri’s second set of ideas is more explicitly concerned with the engagement
decision. He, too, shares the assumption that people will try to avoid escalatory episodes
and seek out those more likely to generate agreement. Here we discover him proposing
engagement hypotheses directly. His predictions are these (I have expressed them as
being about avoidance):
5. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they feel their reasons are
weaker than those of their cointeractant.
6. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they estimate that the
other person’s disagreeing thought is so important to the other person that change in view
is unlikely.
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7. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they consider the
argument’s domain so complex that a completely satisfying exploration would be
unacceptably costly in terms of resources.
8. People are less likely to engage in an argument when its topic or implications
are sensitive to self, other, or relationship.
9. People are less likely to engage in an argument when social considerations
strongly indicate that they should be agreeing and not disagreeing.
10. People are less likely to engage in an argument on topics where the fact of
disagreement would be personally consequential. (Topics such as disagreements about
music or sports are expected not to imply personal consequences.)
11. People are less likely to engage in an argument as part of a persuasion
dialogue than an inquiry dialogue.
12. People are less likely to engage in an argument when the interlocutor has
higher power and one’s position is weak or picayune.
13. People are less likely to engage in an argument in public than in private.
Some of these more specific hypotheses are similar to those following from the first,
more abstract, set of considerations. I think that all of them can be understood as
particular manifestations of people’s anticipations about epistemology, costs and benefits,
articulation, and socio-cultural matters. In fact, I believe that all of them can be
subordinated to the general topic of costs and benefits.
In other words, my reading of Paglieri’s paper suggests that he has given us a
three layered theory of argument engagement and escalation. The highest level concept is
costs and benefits. These are subjectively understood and projected by the arguers. The
ratio of costs to benefits should permit us to predict the decision to argue or not. A highly
accurate theory requires not only that we have a fairly full description of potential
rewards and punishments, but also that we know what alternative activities are available
to the arguer. For instance, a person might well choose to participate in a punishing
argument if the immediate alternative were an embarrassing conversation with someone
else.
The theory’s second layer gives more detail to the ideas of costs and benefits. The
chance of attaining one’s argumentative goals is a benefit, the effort involved in arguing
is a cost, the prospect of escalation implies further costs, and social conventions
automatically identify costs and benefits in various circumstances.
The last layer of considerations also details costs, benefits, and some factors that
make them more or less likely, more or less valued. These include more specific elements
contributing to the chances of success; prospects for personal harm to self, other, or the
relationship between them; the likelihood of emotional reactions, positive or negative;
and how the immediate social setting and norms affect everything else.
3. CONCLUSION
This particular appreciation of Paglieri’s ideas reforms them into a cost/benefit theory of
both engagement and escalation. The very factors that make escalation more likely also
make engagement less likely. By implication, his theory should also account for
arguments that don’t escalate—those that resolve in the way we usually hope for—as
well as decisions to participate. So we have four possible outcome events, organized as
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alternatives at two points in time. First is the engage-avoid pair, and if the argument does
take place, at its end we have predictions about escalate versus resolve. All four events
are predicted by the same set of variables.
The theory has good prospects for empirical support. Cost-benefit theories appear
with different terminology across the social sciences. Besides cost/benefit, we find
terminology such as Subjective Expected Utility and Predicted Outcome Value. By and
large, if a voluntary human decision can be pressed into a frame in which it makes sense
to assess probability and value of outcome, the theory will find good empirical support
when it predicts the decision or outcome (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen 1975, Lave & March
1975, Marek et al. 2004, Thibaut & Kelley 1959, Uehara 1990).
Paglieri’s thinking offers an opportunity for advance in our understanding of
argumentation. Escalation and unproductive arguments have been widely studied in the
conflict management literature (e.g., Deutsch 1973, Folger et al. 2005), but as we know,
not always from a perspective well informed by argument studies. The decision to engage
in an argument appears from time to time in our argumentation and communication
theories (e.g., Dillard 2004, Trapp & Hoff 1985). However, it is mainly theorized in the
context of trait perspectives (e.g., Rancer & Avgis 2006), and therefore does not reach the
precision and sensitivity of Paglieri’s thinking. Paglieri’s paper forms the basis for what
could be a productive research program concerned with how people decide to argue, or
not, and with whether their arguments are productive or destructive.
Link to paper
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